Gulf War Syndrome Essay Example

and colleagues from The University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas (Haley et al.). To support their research, a mathematical computer technique was utilized to analyze symptoms reported by 25% of 249 veterans who served in the Desert Conflict (Haley et al.).

According to the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), there are three identified syndromes:

- Syndrome-1 or "Impaired Cognition" Syndrome: This syndrome is characterized by symptoms such as distractibility, difficulty remembering, depression, insomnia, fatigue, slurring of speech, confused thought process, and migraine-like headaches (Haley et al.).

- Syndrome-2 or "Confusion-ataxia" Syndrome: Individuals with this syndrome encounter problems with cognitive processes such as reading, writing, and spelling.They also experience challenges with orientation; for example, they may become disoriented or confused while attempting to locate a car in a parking lot. Additionally, individuals with this syndrome might have received a physician's diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder, depression or liver disease.

- According to Haley et al., sexual impotence may also be present as a symptom in Syndrome-3.The syndrome referred to as "Artho-myo-neuropathy" Syndrome is also recognized as Gulf War Illness. It is described in the article "Gulf War Illnesses Broken Down Into Three Primary Syndromes" (1-2) and is characterized by various symptoms such as extensive joint and muscle pain, fatigue, challenges with lifting heavy objects, and sensations of tingling or numbness in the hands, arms, feet, and legs.

The Gulf War Syndrome is marked by over 20 symptoms, as reported by veterans of the Gulf War.

Research on the Syndrome

According to Stephen Straus in The Lancet journal, more than 50,000 soldiers returned from the war with noticeable changes. Reports showed occurrences of vascular instability, hyperventilation, bacilliuria, and other physiological

and laboratory abnormalities among Gulf War veterans. To address this growing issue, the US allocated $115,000,000 for research specifically aimed at comprehending this enigmatic syndrome.

A study was conducted on 4000 Gulf War veterans and men who served in Bosnia. They were sent questionnaires regarding deployment, exposures, symptoms, and illnesses. The results showed that Gulf War veterans had a higher likelihood of experiencing symptoms such as chronic fatigue, irritability, headache, and others (Straus 162). It was found that the Gulf War carried a high risk of prolonged illness but did not result in increased rates of divorce or unemployment (Straus 163). Another report by Unwin and colleagues indicated that the increased risk of chronic illnesses after the war affected all military branches, including active duty and retired personnel. Additionally, according to factor analysis conducted by Fukuda and colleagues, physical examinations and laboratory investigations did not reveal a specific disease. It was suggested that the absence of significant casualties in the war may have allowed for the true physical and emotional costs of battle to be disclosed (Straus 163).

In the British Medical Journal, Frances Murphy provides information about the Gulf War Syndrome and its symptoms experienced by men. According to Straus, common symptoms reported include fatigue, headaches, joint pains, rashes, shortness of breath, sleep disturbances, difficulty concentrating, and forgetfulness. Murphy emphasizes that troops were exposed to various hazards like oil well fires, petroleum products, fumes, pesticides, as well as other physical and psychological risks. Murphy discusses the possibility of these hazards causing the Gulf War Syndrome. Along with symptoms analysis program was conducted on 1000 British Gulf War Veterans (Murphy 1 of 1).

According to Murphy (year unknown),

participants in the study reported a variety of common medical symptoms. These included affective problems (50%), fatigue (42%), joint and muscle aches (40%), cognitive problems (26%), headaches (26%), respiratory complaints (24%), gastrointestinal problems (22%), sleep disturbances (21%), and skin problems (19%). Similar to Straus' findings, Murphy's research revealed that Gulf War veterans had a higher likelihood of reporting a wide range of symptoms compared to troops who served in Bosnia or had not been deployed. However, it is important to note that Straus focused on American troops while Murphy examined British troops. According to Fukuda et al's research, even non-deployed veterans met the criteria for the illness based on Murphy's findings(1-2). In an article by Jim Coy, factual information about the symptoms and potential causes of Gulf War Syndrome or the Persian Gulf War Illness was presented.

The Department of Defense's (DOD) Involvement in Researching Gulf War Illness

According to Coy, the DOD is conducting research on Gulf War Illness. The symptoms mentioned are similar to those described in other articles, with some additional issues concerning the skin, hair loss, memory loss, upper or lower respiratory symptoms, sleep disruptions, abnormal weight reduction, and menstrual disorders. Moreover, veterans suffering from these symptoms have received minimal or no response from both the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs. Currently, the cause of Gulf War Illness remains unknown. Coy suggests potential factors such as biological warfare agents, chemical warfare agents, exposure to depleted uranium, indigenous infectious diseases,
pesticides,
smoke from oil well fires,
stress levels,
and vaccines. Additionally,
there are currently more than 121 ongoing research projects investigating most of these causes.

According to Coy (51), the most widely accepted explanation for Gulf

War Syndrome involves a combination of multiple factors. In his article "Gulf War Syndrome Cover-UP," Charles Overbeck presents evidence and opinions regarding the concealment of Gulf War Syndrome. Overbeck provides examples of the government's efforts to hide the truth and highlights individuals who are working to uncover the cause of Gulf War Syndrome through facts and theories. He also discusses the mistakes made by the Department of Defense and their disregard for warnings that could have potentially prevented Gulf War Syndrome. Overbeck notes that during the Gulf War, Americans were amazed by the military's superior capabilities demonstrated by the United States.

Despite the United States military's favorable casualty ratio of 1000 to 1, Charles Overbeck revealed that numerous surviving veterans have succumbed or are in the process of succumbing to illnesses directly linked to Gulf War Syndrome (Overbeck 1). In addition, Overbeck stated that the precise causes of Mycoplasma Incognita (Gulf War Syndrome) remain unidentified, and the research on GWS is impeded by denials from military and government authorities. Drs. Garth and Nancy Nicolson, former employees of the MD Anderson Cancer Center, have extensively investigated GWS and brought attention to their findings. The couple's involvement in this issue arose when their daughter served in the 101st Airborne.

Both biologists claim that Mycoplasma Incognita serves as a biological weapon, with 40% of the HIV envelope gene being intentionally inserted into the Mycoplasma. Additionally, they discovered that this illness affects individuals with weakened immune systems. Overbeck also revealed that the military administered experimental drugs to its troops for protection against chemical warfare without disclosing any potential side effects. It is important to note that the Food and Drug Administration

enacted the Interim Rule, which allows the military to utilize experimental drugs on troops without their consent; this rule remains in effect according to Overbeck (1-2). Similarly, Peter Kawaja from the International Gulf War Illness Coalition mentioned that the MD Anderson Cancer Center ordered the destruction of blood samples obtained from Gulf War veterans shortly after the Nicholsons were terminated.

According to Kawaja, testing was only conducted in the Anderson Center due to lack of funding and overwhelming pressure from the government, which hindered further research efforts. Overbeck claims that the government, which had denied it from the beginning, finally released documents acknowledging that Gulf War Veterans were indeed exposed to chemical and biological agents during the Gulf War. Furthermore, activists suggest that US companies had sold such agents to Iraq.

An Article About OP Nerve Agents

James Tuite mentioned that Czech chemical units alerted the US military about certain nerve agents and mustard gas; however, despite these warnings and the activation of chemical weapons alarms, troops were still instructed to disregard them (Overbeck 1-2). One of the potential chemical explosions involved a nerve agent named soman.

The article “OP NERVE AGENTS: A BIOGRAPHY” indicates that soman, one of the commonly deployed nerve agents, is particularly challenging to reverse and treat. It further notes that the US field injector used for nerve agent protection (PAM-CI, atropine) is greatly ineffective against soman. A comparable nerve agent, GF, found in Iraqi chemical stockpiles and used during Saddam Hussein’s war against Iran and the Kurds, could have presented similar difficulties.

It is concerning that there is limited knowledge about the side effects of a certain substance, and this lack of understanding may

pose a threat in future conflicts involving Iraq. According to "OP Nerve Agents: A Biography" (44), it is evident that the military may not have been adequately prepared for chemical exposure. Additionally, Kurt Kleiner suggests that the syndrome could be a result of a combination of pills intended to safeguard our troops against nerve gas, along with an insect repellent. Supporting his findings, he mentions two separate studies conducted on chickens and rats, which concluded that the chemicals caused nerve damage. The article also provides descriptions of the three pills potentially consumed by the troops: Pyridostigmine bromide, a medication that shields against nerve gas effects; DEET, an insect repellent used on the skin.

A study conducted by Duke University researchers found that when Pyridostigmine bromide and DEET were combined, chickens experienced difficulty in walking and sometimes even paralysis. The Department of Defense also discovered that this combination had a higher toxicity level in rats compared to using either substance separately. This prompts the question of whether the same effect can occur in humans, potentially linking it to Gulf War Syndrome as chickens and rats exhibited similar symptoms to our affected troops (Kleiner 5). However, David Brown's article contradicts these findings. He mentions that a blue-ribbon panel appointed by the National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine stated that there is no evidence of chemical or biological weapon usage during the Persian Gulf War in 1991.

Brown (a6) reported that a team of physicians, epidemiologists, and environmental health specialists found no valid information or medical validation supporting the claims of poison gas usage in the Gulf War against coalition forces. The team also disputed the idea that vaccines

or pyridostigmine, an antidote, caused illnesses associated with service during Operation Desert Storm. According to Brown (a6-a8), the team discovered no proof that vaccines in general were responsible for the nonspecific complaints related to Gulf War service and expressed doubt about pyridostigmine being accountable for chronic illness.

Causes of Gulf War Syndrome in "What’s really causing Gulf War illness?" by Gunjan Sinha

Gunjan Sinha's article discusses Garth Nicolson's research on mycoplasmas as a potential cause of Gulf War Syndrome. Sinha also highlights Nicolson's finding of a potential cure for the syndrome using the antibiotic doxycycline.

Sinha provides examples of scientists who both support and criticize Nicolson's data in his work "What’s really causing Gulf War illness?". The purpose of the work is to inform readers about a potential cure and cause for Gulf War Illness (GWI), also known as Gulf War Syndrome. Sinha asserts that a cure for GWI is forthcoming and that his work serves as a reliable source of information (Sinha 70-75). In the initial three paragraphs, Sinha shares a narrative about Sharon Nicolson's participation in Operation Desert Storm.

Sharon Nicolson started experiencing symptoms of Gulf War Syndrome after the war ended, including sweating in sleep, achy joints, and disturbed vision. Sinha then discusses Garth Nicolson's role in addressing his stepdaughter's symptoms. Sinha describes Garth Nicolson's discovery of doxycycline, an antibiotic that could potentially be a cure for Gulf War Syndrome. After Sharon took the drug for a year, she was able to recover. Sinha's account offers hope to readers and provides important information for individuals suffering from Gulf War Syndrome (Sinha 70).

According to the narrative, Sharon's division and their family members experienced similar symptoms. To

address this, Nicolson prescribed the antibiotic doxycycline, which led to the recovery and negative test results for most patients. Despite Nicolson's remarkable achievement, his data faced criticism from scientific peers including Joel Baseman, Shih-Ching Lo, and other scientists, as mentioned by Sinha.

The criticisms against Garth Nicolson's technique lasted for two years until Rep. Norm Dicks organized a meeting. Following the meeting, scientists Lo, Baseman, and others agreed to learn and implement Nicolson's technique. If Nicolson's theory becomes a reality, it could potentially be a significant advancement in the treatment of Gulf War Syndrome, benefiting millions of sufferers (Sinha 71-72). Sinha's narration of these events is both intriguing and informative.

Utilizing a unique approach, the author of this article introduces a short story about Sharon Nicolson. Unlike other articles that solely present facts and historical information, this particular piece offers solace to individuals afflicted with Gulf War Syndrome or comparable illnesses. In addition to discussing scientists involved in the research, the author explores definitions, viewpoints, and government research shortcomings (which are infrequent) concerning GWI, providing detailed examples. A notable instance of Sinha's educational approach is his elucidation of mycoplasmas, the tiniest self-replicating life forms. Furthermore, he proceeds to enlighten his audience about related ailments like Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, Fibromyalgia Syndrome, rheumatoid arthritis, and more.

One of the Government flaws he reported was that the "DOD denied veterans’ family members have contracted GWI; even though a 1994 U. S. Senate Committee Survey on 1,200 Veterans found 77 percent of spouses and 65 percent of their children born after the war experience symptoms of GWI (Sinha 75)." Sinha’s article can bring hope to many for

the reason that he points out that Nicolson’s theory is being put on trial. The trial began this spring with patient recruitment between 500 to 1000 veterans within a six-month period.

Results

Sinha says the results will be available a minimum of one year afterward (Sinha 74-75).

According to a report in The Lancet, UK military veterans of the Gulf War experience higher rates of impaired physical functioning, psychological morbidity, and poor perception of general health compared to UK servicemen who were not deployed to the Gulf War (Blatchley 179). Additionally, data from a comprehensive examination of 21,579 Persian Gulf veterans who reported health issues revealed that 17 percent exhibited symptoms potentially linked to Gulf War Syndrome, including evidence of infection (Bower 357). Another twenty-five percent displayed signs of both Gulf War Syndrome and a separate health problem (Bower 357). These findings led to further examinations by internists, psychiatrists, and infectious disease specialists for the 2,306 veterans with the most severe symptoms of Gulf War syndrome (Bower 357).

According to Bower (358), in follow-up exams, the physicians who conducted evaluations attributed only 18 percent of the diagnosed symptoms to Gulf War syndrome. This is a decrease from the initial assessments where 30 percent of all veterans displaying any signs of the syndrome were diagnosed with it. It has been observed from other articles that individuals affected by Gulf War syndrome primarily include those who participated in the Gulf War in 1991, as well as their spouses, children, and contacts. Carol Vinzant suggests that recent survey findings and accounts of victims indicate that Gulf War syndrome is now considered contagious (Vinzant 1). Vinzant, reporting for Reuters, has different sources of

information regarding the victims. He mentions a survey conducted by Sen. Donald Riegle for a Senate committee, which found that 78 percent of wives of veterans have contracted the disease.

According to Vinzant (Vinzant 1), a veteran named Troy Albuck from Illinois stated that 25% of offspring born before the war and 65% born since have also exhibited symptoms associated with the syndrome. Albuck believes that the syndrome is contagious, as everyone he knows is sick and spreading the illness to others. He emphasizes that this is not difficult to understand and points out that they are all just soldiers. In terms of the financial aspect, Coy mentions that the Department of Defense, Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Department of Health and Human Services have increased their understanding of the health status of Gulf War veterans. In 1998, they allocated $115 million in support of 121 research projects related to this syndrome.

In a 1997 annual report, the Research Working Group found that over half of the 121 projects included scientists who were not part of the government. Among these projects, 39 have been finished, 78 are still in progress, and four have received funding but have not yet started (Coy 50-51). The search for a cure for this syndrome has been ongoing since 1991. A potential cure has been proposed by a doctor in New Orleans, as stated by Nolan Walters.

According to Walter's article, Congress declined to provide $3.4 million in funding for the doctor's method in 1995, resulting in a two-year stalemate. Dr. Edward S. Hyman, the New Orleans doctor whom Walter claims has the cure for the syndrome, has been rejected by the

Pentagon on six occasions.

According to Walters, Hyman's treatment involves attacking hidden bacterial infections with high doses of antibiotics and vitamins (Walters 2). Walters also mentions that Hyman examines patients' urine for bacteria that other labs miss. Additionally, Hyman has treated 10 American Veterans, five veterans' wives, and one British veteran of the Gulf War. Out of the American veterans, five relapsed, but three recovered after receiving treatment again. Walters reports that the Pentagon's efforts to track down Desert Storm Syndrome have been unsuccessful, despite spending approximately $100 million on treatment and research (Walters 3). Hence, although the symptoms of Gulf War Syndrome are evident, its exact cause and cure remain unknown.

Conclusion

If the cause or cure cannot be determined, it follows that prevention of this syndrome would also be undefined. What will happen if another conflict arises in the Gulf? Will our future troops be deceived and manipulated by the military? Will they be assured that chemical warfare will not be employed? The answer is uncertain, and if someone does know, they may attempt to conceal it. The individuals at the Pentagon demonstrate a lack of concern for those who perish from this illness, but this negligence could have consequences if left unaddressed.

This article discusses the possibility that Gulf War Syndrome could become a major conflict in the future and potentially be as widespread and impactful as cancer and AIDS if it is contagious. The author questions whether there could be a hidden message from God behind this confusing situation.

Works Cited

1. Blutchley, Nick. “Is there a Gulf War Syndrome?” The Lancet

353.9148 (1999): 179-182. Infoweb. Online. Proquest. 1 May 1999.

Newsbank. 1 May 1999.

• Brown, David. “No Evidence Chemical Weapons Used In Gulf War, Panel Says.” Washington Post 5.
• Kleiner, Kurt. “Did Toxic Mix Cause Gulf Sickness?” Biology Digest 146.1974 (1995) : 5. Infoweb.
• Murphy, Frances M. “Gulf war syndrome: There may be no specific syndrome, but troops suffer after most wars.” British Medical Journal 318.7179 (1999): 245-274.

Infoweb. Online. Proquest. 1 May 1999.

Online. Proquest. 1 May 1999.

"Bridging the gulf in war syndromes." The Lancet 353.9148 (1999): 162-163. Infoweb. Online. Proquest. 1 May 1999.

"Survey shows that Gulf War Syndrome may be contagious" (Reuters, 20 October 1994: 1-3). Retrieved from Infoweb Online Newsbank on 1 May 1999.

Infoweb. Online. Newsbank. 1 May 1999.